Animacy influences causal reasoning via counterfactuals.

Bryan González¹, Tobias Gerstenberg², Jonathan Phillips¹

¹Dartmouth College, ²Stanford University

Animacy does not influence causal judgments


- Prior work suggests different cognitive mechanisms for causal reasoning with respect to agents/objects.1
- Causal judgments for agents may be influenced by intentionality, which is lacking for objects.
- We examine whether agents and objects are judged as causes to the same extent for the same outcome.
- Differences in causal judgments may indicate distinct cognitive mechanisms, while similarity suggests a single domain-general


Actual outcome (in/out)



N = 105

Animacy (agent/object)





"Ball A caused Ball B to land

in[miss] the pocket." (0-100)

Animacy X

 $\chi 2(1) = 0.023, p = .88$

Actual x Counterfactual $\chi 2(2) = 8.191, p = .004$

Actual x Counterfactual x Animacy

 $\chi 2(1) = .742, p = .38$

Causal ratings were NOT different across animacy conditions.

(blue vs orange)

Causal judgments about agents & objects differ as a function of the counterfactuals they afford

- · We indirectly manipulated the contrast of actual and counterfactual outcomes through animacy perception.
- Focus on overdetermination, where an outcome does not counterfactually depend on a single cause, instead multiple events are individually sufficient to bring about the
- · Agents, not objects, are able to change (prevent) the outcome in a relevant counterfactual Between-subjects Outcome event


Methods

- · A priming clip manipulated animacy perception with different ball movements.
- Outcome clip showed identical physics simulation for both animate and inanimate groups.
- Participants rated causal and counterfactual statements using a slider scale.

prime clip A. Inanimate Agent (both groups) C. Test clip B. Animate Agent

objects for same event

Outcome judged more dependent on agent than object





The effect of animacy on causal rating is mediated by counterfactual dependence


Immoral agent was perceived as more causal to destructive outcomes than their inanimate Agents rated more causal than counterpart.

- Moral norm violations had higher causal attribution ratings compared to rational norm violations.
- Other data (not shown) suggest that irrational agent was viewed by participants as moving unintentionally.
- Further work is needed to clarify the role of intentionality in causal judgment as distinct from animacy

Prescriptions of how agents/objects should move influence relevant counterfactuals

- Prescriptive norms play a crucial role in determining counterfactual relevance for animate
- People attribute increased causality for an outcome to agents violating social or moral
- Manipulating normativity and animacy reveals the influence of prescriptive expectations on causal judgments.

Between-subjects prime



Expectation: Violation:


"It is Pink's job to protect Green's tower."

Immoral agent

Irrational agent "Green wants to protect



"The [agent / patient] ball caused the tower to collapse.



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